Editorial

The first-ever V4+India Foreign Ministers’ meeting on the sidelines of the 81st UN General Assembly marks a meaningful step forward in India’s long campaign for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar rightly described the gathering as a “new historic occasion.” The collective endorsement from Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic—the Visegrád Group—adds tangible European weight to New Delhi’s case.

Slovak Foreign Minister Juraj Blanár articulated the group’s position clearly: India, as part of the Global South and an “upcoming superpower in the Indo-Pacific,” must have a permanent place at the Security Council table. This is not mere diplomatic courtesy. Coming from four Central European nations that have themselves navigated complex post-Cold War transitions and remain sensitive to questions of representation and sovereignty, the statement carries credibility.

The meeting went beyond symbolism. India and the V4 agreed to institutionalise the partnership through annual foreign ministers’ meetings and an annual business forum. They also committed to deeper cooperation in defence, technology, innovation, research, education, space, connectivity and people-to-people ties. These practical steps matter. They convert political support into sustained engagement and create incentives for both sides to invest in the relationship.

India’s case for permanent membership has always rested on objective realities: its size, demographic weight, economic growth, contributions to UN peacekeeping, and role as a bridge between the developed and developing worlds. Yet reform of the Security Council remains blocked by entrenched interests and procedural hurdles. Every new expression of support from countries outside the traditional P5 orbit strengthens the moral and political argument that the Council’s current structure is outdated.

The V4 endorsement also reflects a broader trend. As the world grows multipolar, middle powers are seeking diversified partnerships. For the Visegrád countries, closer ties with India offer access to a large and growing market, technology collaboration and a partner that shares concerns about an overly rigid international order. For India, it expands its European outreach beyond the usual Western European capitals and reinforces the message that its candidacy enjoys support across regions.

Of course, one meeting does not rewrite the UN Charter. Real reform still requires consensus among the permanent members and a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly. But diplomacy is cumulative. Each such affirmation chips away at the status quo and builds the coalition necessary for eventual change. Jaishankar’s characterisation of the occasion as historic is therefore justified—not because it delivers an immediate breakthrough, but because it signals that India’s claim is increasingly viewed as both legitimate and inevitable by a wider circle of nations. In an era of global flux, that recognition is itself a diplomatic achievement worth building upon.

The decision by CNN, MS NOW and Politico to sue the Trump administration over their exclusion from the White House is more than a routine press-access dispute. It is a stark test of whether the First Amendment still restrains a president who openly admits he is punishing coverage he dislikes.

President Trump announced the ban on Friday, citing “fake news” and “fiction or lies.” By Saturday, reporters from the three outlets found their credentials revoked and themselves turned away at the gates. On Monday the outlets filed suit in federal court in Washington, arguing that the action violates both the First Amendment and due-process guarantees. Simultaneously, the major television networks—ABC, CBS, NBC, Fox and CNN—suspended their long-standing pool coverage rather than replace the barred CNN as the rotating pool provider. Within hours the White House answered with “Trump TV,” a streaming channel offering administration-selected highlights.

These developments form a coherent pattern. Credentialing the press has always involved security and logistical limits, but it has never been treated as a pure presidential prerogative to reward friendly coverage and punish critical reporting. Courts have repeatedly held that once the government opens the White House to journalists, it may not exclude them on viewpoint grounds without process. The abrupt, content-based nature of this ban places it on thin constitutional ice.

The networks’ collective refusal to staff the pool is itself significant. Pool arrangements exist so that the public receives independent visual records of presidential activity. When the White House effectively collapses that system by excluding one member, the remaining outlets face a choice: cooperate in the exclusion or withdraw. Their withdrawal, however imperfect, signals that institutional self-interest can still align with principle.

“Trump TV” completes the picture. Governments have long produced their own communications. What is new is the timing and framing: a state channel launched the same day independent pool coverage collapsed. Citizens are free to watch official messaging; they are not free to have independent journalism systematically sidelined from the places where power is exercised.

None of this requires romanticising the media. Outlets make errors, chase narratives and sometimes display bias. Presidents of both parties have complained, often with justification. But the remedy for imperfect journalism is more journalism, competitive markets and public judgment—not selective exclusion enforced by the Secret Service. A democracy that allows the executive to curate its own press corps is one that has already begun to hollow out the accountability the Constitution was designed to protect. The lawsuit will test whether courts still treat that principle as binding. The public interest lies in a swift, clear ruling that restores access and reaffirms that the government does not get to decide which reporters are allowed to watch.

• SAS Kirmani