Editorial

National Security Advisor Ajit Doval’s arrival in Beijing for the 25th round of Special Representatives talks with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi marks a pivotal moment in India-China relations. Scheduled for Tuesday, these discussions on the long-standing boundary question come barely weeks before Chinese President Xi Jinping’s expected visit to New Delhi for the BRICS summit in mid-September—his first trip to India since the 2019 Mamallapuram informal summit. The timing is deliberate and consequential.

The Special Representatives mechanism, established in 2003, remains the primary channel for seeking a comprehensive settlement of the 3,488-km disputed border. After a five-year freeze following the 2020 Galwan clash, dialogue resumed gradually. The previous round in New Delhi last August reaffirmed the 2005 Political Parameters and Guiding Principles. This latest engagement is the first in a year and reflects cautious efforts to stabilise the Line of Actual Control while exploring limited progress on delimitation and border management.

For India, the core principle is clear and non-negotiable: peace and tranquillity along the border is the essential prerequisite for any meaningful normalisation of bilateral ties. External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar has reiterated this consistently. Recent reports of Chinese activity in Arunachal Pradesh’s Upper Subansiri sector underscore why New Delhi cannot afford complacency. Any durable relationship must rest on mutual respect for territorial integrity and an end to unilateral attempts to alter the status quo.

China, for its part, continues to frame the boundary issue as one that should not define the entire relationship, emphasising economic cooperation, trade (despite India’s persistent deficit), and Global South solidarity. Yet history shows that unresolved border friction repeatedly disrupts broader engagement. The post-2020 experience—disengagement in some sectors, restoration of limited connectivity, and resumed high-level contacts—demonstrates that progress is possible when both sides exercise restraint. It also shows how fragile such gains remain.

Doval’s visit offers an opportunity to consolidate de-escalation, strengthen communication mechanisms, and explore “early harvest” measures on boundary delimitation without compromising India’s core interests. Success would create a more favourable climate for a potential Modi-Xi meeting on the sidelines of BRICS, allowing the two leaders to provide political direction to the relationship.

India and China are not destined to be permanent adversaries, but neither can they return to the pre-2020 illusion of strategic partnership without addressing the fundamental trust deficit on the border. These talks will not resolve the boundary dispute overnight. They can, however, determine whether the current phase of managed competition evolves into something more constructive—or risks sliding back into confrontation. The responsibility rests equally on both sides to choose the path of realism and restraint.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian’s defence of a June memorandum of understanding with the United States as the “best path” out of the current deadlock is a telling admission. Nearly six months after the conflict began with US-Israeli strikes, and with the 60-day window of that MoU long expired, Tehran finds itself trapped in a costly limbo of “neither war nor peace.” Pezeshkian is right that the agreement contained no capitulation and that Iran’s economy cannot attract investment while uncertainty persists. Yet his pragmatic tone stands in sharp contrast to the harder line emerging from the new leadership of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council.

Mohsen Rezaei’s warning that any country supporting further US sanctions would be committing an “act of war,” coupled with threats of “seismic” retaliation and the complete halt of Gulf oil exports, escalates an already volatile situation. The United States, for its part, has framed its forthcoming measures as an “economic D-Day”—the most severe financial offensive ever mounted against an adversary. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent’s language leaves little room for compromise, targeting not only Iran but any partners still providing economic lifelines.

This mutual escalation risks drawing regional states into a confrontation they neither seek nor can easily contain. The Strait of Hormuz remains a global chokepoint; further disruption would inflict pain far beyond the combatants. At this delicate moment, Pakistan’s Army Chief Field Marshal Asim Munir arrives in Tehran. Islamabad has played a consistent mediating role since the early days of the conflict, helping broker earlier ceasefires and the original MoU. Munir’s visit is therefore more than bilateral diplomacy; it is a rare opportunity to inject a measure of realism into a process that has otherwise stalled.

Neither maximalist sanctions nor maximalist threats of retaliation offer a sustainable exit. Iran’s leadership must recognise that continued ambiguity over the Strait and nuclear questions only deepens economic isolation. Washington must acknowledge that pure economic warfare, however robust, has rarely forced Tehran into fundamental political change and carries significant costs for global energy markets and US allies. Third-party mediation, particularly from countries with genuine regional stakes, remains the least bad option.

The alternative is prolonged attrition that solves nothing while endangering the wider region. Pezeshkian’s call for a return to the MoU framework, however imperfect, at least points toward negotiation rather than perpetual confrontation. Whether Tehran’s hard-liners and Washington’s pressure campaign can still make space for that path will determine if this stalemate ends in diplomacy—or something far worse.

• SAS Kirmani